neglects to use his powers to achieve an object, viz., his death, the very contrary of that for which they are naturally disposed. This is a direct violation of Natural law and therefore of God's law. Furthermore, man as a rational animal achieves his perfection and last end by using his body.
If by suicide he makes this use impossible, he is by that act making it impossible for himself to achieve his last end. This is the [143] greatest perversion of rational nature that is possible. Moreover, suicide is a serious offence against society, for man is naturally destined for society and is an organism that belongs to it. It is obvious also that man was created by an intelligent Being, Who had a purpose in creating him. Man, by creation, is a servant of God; no servant has dominion over those elements that are of the essence of his service. The suicide prevents the divine purpose from being realized and interrupts his service of God. Again, man like all else must subserve the glory of God. He cannot do so equally well by putting an end to his life as by continuing to live.
A last will sometimes contains a direction that the heart or brain should be punctured, or a vein opened, in order to prevent the possibility of premature burial; or the relatives may direct that such operations should be done. It is obvious that the intention of killing one who is only apparently dead or who may not be dead is not permitted. But if the signs of death are clear, or if a medical death certificate has been given, it is as defensible to puncture brain or heart or to open a vein as to bury the body in the earth. The procedure is not allowable as a precautionary measure.
Practical Applications
1. The hunger strike, as a political weapon against tyrannical usurpation, or as a protest against unjust imprisonment, has been justified on the ground that death is not thereby intended but permitted only, if in fact it happen; that to abstain from food is not in itself wrong, and that the permission of death, a great physical evil, may be justified for a really good reason, if the object to be secured by the hunger strike has a good prospect of being realized. The Christian martyrs are not blamed for having refused food that had been offered to idols. We may risk our lives for others and give to others the food that is essential to preserve our own lives.
Much has been written on both sides of this question. The issue is a very clear one, and the statement of principles should be clear and capable of being easily understood. [144] In the concrete case, the application of principles depends on the correct balancing of pros and cons and on a knowledge of local circumstances. The following principles may, we think, be stated as self--evident (a) No intention, however good, will make a bad action morally right. In the case of the hunger strike, it is of first importance to examine the means employed, for we have to be careful to exclude motive when we are judging of means only.
(b) The means employed are abstention from all food even to the point of actual death, if necessary.
(c) Such abstention will surely be justifiable if to take the proffered food would be sinful. This was so in the case of the Christian martyrs, for to take the food would have savoured of apostasy and would have given great scandal.
(d) In the modern hunger strike, if the imprisonment is just, the complete abstention from food would be immoral.
(e) If the prisoner intend to starve till death, and intend also that his death shall be the means of bringing deserved odium upon his enemies, it seems that he would intend first to inflict on munitions is unjust, and the probability of the existence of munitions on board does not countervail the certain right to life of non--combatant passengers. The case may, however, be imagined, when even a hospital ship will be so valuable to the enemy for future aggression during a war that it may be of vital concern to sink it. Though such a necessity would be deplorable, we think the sinking of it may be justified, for what is attacked is the ship, the deaths of those on board are incidental and not wished, and the loss of a few lives is nothing in comparison with the defeat of a nation. When a nation's existence is at stake, the principles of humanity--as they are called--must be regretfully sacrificed to the very existence of a people, but never the principles of justice.
Enemy troops may be starved by blockade. If civilians suffer, it is not intended that they should suffer; it is their misfortune, and it is due to the fortune of a just war that they happen to be in the same place as their army. Blockade and siege are in principle not different from the bombing of fortified garrison towns.
Reprisals taken merely as an act of vengeance or on defenceless places or persons, in no way connected with war, are entirely unjustifiable. The plea of military necessity is sometimes invoked. The term is used to condone appalling cruelty. Carried to its logical conclusion, it leads to the cold--blooded destruction of women and children, a measure that may be alleged to be the only means of reducing the civilian population to its senses. Soldiers, however, in the heat of battle, or in desperate situations, cannot be expected to see the application of true principles through the bloody medium of war. The State that acts on the principles of justice and forbearance from evil in victory and defeat, will preserve the honour of its people and save its soul. [151] Victors in a just war may rightly insist on the restoration of honour, property and amicable relations. They may use all legitimate methods to safeguard a just treaty. But the fear of possible aggression by the enemy in the distant future is not a reason for utterly subjugating and breaking the spirit of a people, for patriotism--a necessary and a Christian virtue--may not exclude justice to other nationals. Justice, not to speak of charity, requires that the victors should live and let live, so far, that is, as is consistent with present self-defence and self-preservation. If the terms of peace are needlessly crushing or manifestly unjust, there is no obligation to observe them. But as it is exceedingly difficult to arrive at a true estimate in these matters, arbitration is often the only way to secure justice to both parties.
SECTION 6. Capital Punishment
God has given to the State the right over life and death, as He has given to every man the right of self-defence against unjust aggression. This moral power of the State has been universally acknowledged in Christian tradition. It is explicitly declared in Scripture to have existed in the Jewish State (Exod. 22,18 sqq.); it was recognized in the Roman polity by S. Paul (Rom. 13, 4) : "For he [the Prince] is God's minister to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, fear; for he beareth not the sword in vain." If, therefore, capital punishment is necessary for peace and the security of life and property, and if no less punishment avails, it is conceded to the State by God the source of all authority, whose Will is that man should live without unjust molestation. But this power must be exercised so as not to invade individual rights. Therefore, the accused must normally have opportunities of pleading his case; the crime punished by death must be legally deserving of the supreme penalty, and it must be established beyond doubt. In emergencies, and where the crime is certain, the State may justly dispense with the usual formalities and execute the criminal without delay. Where the proscription of criminals, justly condemned to death by the State, has been declared, the State [152] makes and rightly makes individual citizens its legitimate executioners, but the procedure can be justified only in the rarest cases and with the most minute safeguards.
No one, however guilty, may be put to death by private initiative, except in a case of actual self-defence. Lynch law is, therefore, unjustifiable, as it is a rough and ready assumption by a section of the people of a power which they do not possess.
A father or husband may not put to death an adulterer who attacks his honour through the honour of daughter or wife; nor may a man put to death his own daughter or wife caught in the act of adultery. It was stated in Rex v. Ellor, in judgment by Lord Chief Justice (July 26, 1929) , that " If a man discovered his wife in the act of adultery, and then killed the adulterer, the law regarded that as manslaughter, because it was regarded as equivalent to a blow struck at the husband, that is to say, in its effect on his self-control."
The crime of killing the adulterer even long after the fact, which is an act of revenge, has been condoned by some modern juries, but it is indefensible.
It is sinful to kill a culprit who attempts to escape, unless this is done in self-defence, or with the sanction of public authority. Sentinels may shoot, if ordered to do so, at one who, after warning, disregards the challenge, but life should be spared, if possible.
SECTION 7. Indirect Killing
Everyone has a natural right to defend himself against unjust aggression even to the death of the assailant, if that be necessary. If less than death, such as wounding or disabling, is sufficient, to do more is sinful and against justice. The same right may be exercised to defend the life of another who is unjustly attacked, or to defend bodily integrity of great moment, or to safeguard material possessions, if relatively of considerable value, or to defend a woman's honour.
In the act of self-defence, the principle that justifies one's act, even if it issue in the death of the assailant, is valid to[153] its utmost limit, and if in my self--defence the unjust assailant is killed, the principle that justifies my act which causes his death is not the principle that his right to life is subservient to my right to life, but that his unjust aggression may be repelled with all necessary violence. But the assailant's death is a secondary result of my act, the primary result being my own defence. The doctrine is justified on the universally valid principle of the double effect. The death of the aggressor need never be intended as an end nor as a means. The whole of my defensive action has as its intended and its first and direct result my own preservation; its second, consequential, indirect and permitted result may be the death of the assailant. Those who permit the directly intended killing of the assailant are misled by the fallacy that what we can rightly permit we may rightly do. What we rightly do is to defend our life; we need intend nothing else. It is not true to say that what we rightly permit we may rightly intend.
The aggression spoken of must be practically present or imminent and not past, since revenge is not self--defence; but a thief, taking away property of great relative value, may be pursued and attacked if necessary, but he still retains the right to defend his life. A woman may not kill her ravisher after the event, though she may punish and maltreat him to deter him from future aggression. This is medicinal not vindictive punishment, and is permitted on the ground of equity. She may also assail one who solicits her.
If aggression is only materially unjust, as would be the case of attack by a madman, or of one who is intoxicated, one retains the right of self--defence, for these rights issue from one's right to life, whatever be the nature of the unjust aggression.
[154] The conditions, therefore, that justify self--defence, even to the death of the assailant, are 1. The aggression must be actual or imminent. 2. The harm anticipated must be very grave, such as loss of life, mutilation, loss of chastity, loss of temporal goods of great value, absolutely or even relatively. What constitutes absolute value in the case, it is impossible to say very definitely. One may take as the standard the common opinion of people, and one could say, without exaggerated strictness, that one hundred pounds sterling would be considered by all people at present to be an extraordinary sum to lose.
[
1 In 1679, Pope Innocent XI condemned the opinion that one gold piece regularly constituted such a sum.] This is not, of course, the relative standard. 3. The act of self--defence must be the only resource at the moment. It is not lawful to kill another who attacks our honour in words only, for though it is a serious offence to dishonour people, less violent defence is always possible. The contrary was formerly held by some divines, but since the time of Popes Alexander VII and Innocent XI, the opinion has had no defenders. Furthermore, there are other ways of redress, and personal estimates of honour and good name are so various, and there is so grave a possibility of mistake, not to say passion, that if such extreme defence were permissible, murders innumerable could be committed.
Killing the Innocent
It is never allowed to kill an innocent person with direct intent to do so, whether by public or private authority, not even to secure the common good, for such killing is forbidden by divine positive law, and is contrary to Natural law also.
It is permissible, however, for a good reason to do that which, being in itself not wrong, may result in the death of an innocent person as a secondary effect. Such secondary effects, foreseen, permitted, but not directly willed, take place in the bombing of fortified towns, in the sinking of merchant ships or hospital ships which are conveying [155] munitions of war. But in all cases, the evil effects should not be greater than the good effect hoped for. This relative proportion can seldom be quite clear. But it would obviously be unjust to sink ships on the off--chance of their having on board munitions of war, as this would be to attack a probable aggressor, who has a certain right to life until he has certainly proved to be an actual aggressor.
Manslaughter that results from dangerous acts, such as furious driving in frequented places, is imputable if foreseen as probable.
It is sinful to kill those who are fatally wounded or the dying, on the plea of putting an end to their pain, or to kill violent lunatics if their actual aggression can be countered without killing, or an innocent person in order to save a city from destruction, though, if he is already bound to offer himself to the enemy, in accordance with agreement in order to save the rest, he may probably be handed over by his own people. Similarly, it is sinful to kill enemy hostages or legates even if the enemy has broken faith.
Doctors, nurses and midwives sin seriously, if through grave negligence, and still more, if, of set purpose, they cause or hasten the deaths of patients, or do not use reasonable and ordinary precautions, for their duty is to keep patients alive, they have no privilege of killing them. Furthermore, doctors may not use the bodies of the sick as a corpus vile for experimenting with uncertain remedies when surer remedies can be used. When there are no sure remedies, a doctor may test the remedial nature of newly discovered drugs, if there is no risk to the patient. It is sinful to sacrifice the lives of some in order to save others, but one may sacrifice oneself to save the lives of others, if the means taken are not wrong in themselves. A positive act by which one commits direct suicide would obviously be wrong. To allow others to get out of a building on fire first is not a positive act of suicide.
[156]
SECTION 8. Mutilation and Sterilization
1. The body may not be mutilated unless mutilation is the only available means of saving the rest of the body, i.e., its life or health. Since man may not take away his life, so neither may he mutilate his body, for the members of his body are not his to dispose of, but are to be used in their integrity to help him to fulfil the divine purpose and achieve his own perfection and last end. But since life is better than a member of the body, the latter may be sacrificed, if necessary, to save the whole body.
2. The sterilization of criminals and defectives has been both practised and defended, and since the matter in the case of mental defectives is likely to become a practical one in the near future, it is necessary to state what is here apprehended as the Catholic opinion on it, without prejudice to the claims of health and without subscribing to exaggerated claims on behalf of the State.
The purpose of this operation is to prevent propagation, a result that is secured by preventing the male and the female elements, necessary for conception, from approaching one another.
The operation is a surgical one, chiefly on the male, but also, though less frequently, on the female. In the case of the male, it is done by severing both tubes, called the vasa deferentia, along which the male fecundating element passes into the seminal vesicles. The ends of the severed tubes are ligatured, and no more seminal secretion can pass from the place where it is made, viz., the testicles, to the place where it is stored ready for use. Such a person would, after a short time, be absolutely sterile if the operation had been perfectly done, because the fecundating element is blocked at its source, though it continues to pass its hormones into the blood circulation.
The female is sterilized sometimes by the severance of both fallopian tubes, the ends of which are buried under the peritoneum of the broad ligament. To make the result more secure, both cornua of the uterus are excised and the[157] cut ends or surfaces are sutured. Another operation for producing an eschar at the uterine orifice of the fallopian tubes is said to be successful. Physicians are also studying dietetic methods which have proved successful in the case of some of the lower animals. Irradiation of the ovaries by radium or X--rays is said to be effectual.
The so--called unfit may be a physical or a mental degenerate. The physical degenerate is a person who is either physically tainted with some serious transmissible disease, and that condition is considered one reason for preventing marriage; or a person may be so deficient in ordinary physique that the offspring would be thought likely to be a useless burden on the State.
The mentally unfit are either mentally defective by the usual intelligence tests, or may evince criminal propensities. The term, moral imbecile, has given rise to controversy, for it is held that there are no inherited criminal propensities, moral imbecility being rather a matter of mental or temperamental deficiency.
Sterilization has been recommended on three distinct grounds, namely, therapeutic, eugenic, and punitive. In regard to the first, namely, therapeutic, it would be defensible if it were necessary for the life or health of the individual. When the purpose of sterilization is eugenic, it is designed to prevent the propagation of unfit offspring, and disease, misery, and crime in future generations. The dominant motive, therefore, of those who recommend the eugenic sterilization of the unfit is the benefit of the State. The State wants healthy citizens. For the sake of self-defence, progress in all the arts of civilization and therefore for the material happiness of the people, the State must have healthy citizens. It is the business of the State to see [158] to that, and we are justified in helping it to realize that object. Again, the State does not wish to burden citizens with crushing taxes that the unfit may have the opportunity of propagating their kind. It cannot be maintained that, whereas defectives have a right to marry, they have a right to impose on others the maintenance of their children.
But in defending our rights, we have to take care that the means we employ in doing so are not morally evil, that is, unjust. We must, therefore, ask the questions: Has the State the right to sterilize the unfit that it may not be put to the expense of maintaining unfit citizens ? Has the State the right to mutilate citizens who are not criminals ? Has the State such supreme power over the bodies of its citizens? Does man, by living in society, so subject himself to the State as to become an instrument for the common good to the exclusion of his own natural rights? It is evident that the State has no such rights. It is admitted that the State has power over a man's life and over less than life, namely, man's liberty and his bodily integrity. But the State has only a qualified right. It may not use its power as it pleases, as we use chattels and animals, but the exercise of its power must be subservient to the prior rights of man. These antecedent rights a man does not forgo because he has chosen to live with other men in a State, chiefly for his own good, and that he might, under the protection of society, the more easily achieve that purpose for which he has a body and a life, namely, his own natural perfection and the purpose for which he was created, that is, to serve God and compass his ultimate end. Only for a crime can a man be punished by society. The defective is guilty of no crime by being defective. It is rather his misfortune that he is a defective, and he may rightly claim the protection of the State against those who go about to sterilize citizens who are by them judged to be unfit. It would be a manifest failing in its duty, if the State attacked the bodily integrity of an innocent citizen in any way at all, and still more so if it deprived him of the power which he possesses of being able to propagate, since the actual power to propagate is not an attack on the State even in the most remote degree.
[159] Mutilation is, therefore, one thing and segregation is another. The State segregates the mentally defective, because they are a danger to themselves, or because they are a danger to others, or because those who are responsible for their well--being are unable to fulfil their duty. When the State has, as a fact, segregated them for a just reason, it is not obliged to give them the facilities of marriage and propagation. Two imbeciles, man and woman, have the right to marry if they have sufficient sense to make the contract, knowing what it means and being capable of bringing up offspring in a human way. But when they are segregated for a just reason, they cannot claim to have the opportunities of marriage. Since, therefore, segregation is sufficient for the protection of the defective and of the public, more than segregation would be unjust. We do not of course here say that the purpose of segregation may be simply the prevention of propagation. It is not the actual power of propagating that is inimical to the State. Since, therefore, segregation of defectives, merely for the benefit of the State and not for the benefit of the defective is indefensible, much more indefensible is sterilization of the unfit merely for the benefit of the State. It is not a case of self--defence against an unjust aggressor. In just selfdefence I may employ all methods of warding off attack, even to the killing of my assailant, though I need not intend his death but only my own defence. But if by taking away his revolver I can sufficiently safeguard my life, to do more would be unjust. The State takes away from a drunken man his liberty, and that is sufficient to safeguard both himself and the public. Every punishment and every invasion of personal immunity that are excessive are unjust. Sterilization of defectives is, therefore, unjust, because it is not necessary, it is superfluous, it is excessive, it is an unjust invasion of personal integrity, because defectives are not criminals. To mutilate non--criminals differs only in degree from killing off the unfit.
It is sometimes said in justification of the sterilization of defectives that it is not a serious mutilation. It is induced by a very slight excision, and if necessary, it can be remedied. [160] The patient suffers no pain or inconvenience; indeed, he is sometimes positively improved. But this plea is hardly worth refuting. The keystone of an arch may be very small to look at; the optic nerve is a very small thing; the vas deferens is a small tube, through which a hair will hardly pass. But we judge of these things not by their size but by the function which they fulfil.
The third purpose of sterilization is punitive. In the case of criminals, the State has the undoubted right to inflict the legal punishment, if it be a reasonable one. The punishment of criminals for gross sexual offences by sterilization is not a punishment at all, for it would hardly deter them from crime; it is not a reasonable punishment, for if the criminal is kept imprisoned, there is no need for it; if he is turned loose on the community, he will remain a danger to society precisely in the same way as he was before, for sterilization does not extinguish criminal sexual tendency.
3. Castration, with or without consent, is not permissible, if employed to preserve the beauty, tone and high pitch of the youthful voice. S. Alphonsus records two contrary opinions on the subject. The view permitting it is not now held, nor was it held by more than a few. The fact that such males were permitted to sing in the papal choir is no proof that the Church ever approved of castration for the preservation of the vocal pitch. Indeed, the Church in its canons condemned and condemns (cc. 985, 2354) all such mutilations under severe penalties. Those who defend sterilization of defectives appeal to the custom of allowing these males to sing in church choirs, but the acknowledged difficulty of doing away with a custom that was sanctioned by civil authorities, and the difficulty was by no means imaginary, justified the bishops in tolerating the presence of such singers in church choirs. Pope Benedict XIV refers to the matter, and says that the more common opinion in his day was opposed to the practice of castration for such purposes, but that owing to the attitude of civil authorities, bishops should not expel those singers from the choirs, lest great disturbance should arise.
[161] 4. Mutilation, in the form of vasectomy, is said to diminish intolerable erethism, and if there is no other milder method of doing so, it is permissible with the consent of the patient. So many cases, however, are recorded of permanent cure of sexual erethism by hypnotic suggestion, or even by waking suggestion-we are certainly making no reference here to psychoanalysis-that the method of suggestion seems preferable, if the sufferer can secure the help of successful professional treatment. But there are other methods of curing this painful state, and these should be attempted if possible.
When vasectomy, fallectomy or ovariotomy or any other operations are employed simply for the purpose of producing sterility, in order that sexual intercourse may still be used without issue, the intention and the operation are both grievously sinful and forbidden . . . .
[166]
SECTION 9. Abortion and Feticide
One of the most distressing problems which surgeons have to face is that of saving the lives of both mother and child in difficult cases of parturition. Each has a right to, life, and neither has a better right than the other. It is morally wrong to take away an innocent life directly, that is, with direct explicit intention. Surgical skill has not yet found a method of saving both lives in certain difficult contingencies-assuming that Caesarean section is, in some cases, not possible-and it is, therefore, a matter of common practice, though morally indefensible, to sacrifice the life of the infans in utero in order to save the life of the mother, when this sacrifice is judged to be the only means of doing so.
In approaching the treatment of this difficult subject, it must be said at once that in dealing with life, we are on the plane of Natural law, which binds every man, and not merely on the ecclesiastical plane, that is the plane of positive church law. In this matter, the Church has reenforced by her prohibitions the precepts of Natural law. Nevertheless, it is the business of the Moral theologian to be most careful not to condemn what he does not understand, and at the same time to state the reasons for condemning what he does condemn. If the surgeon wishes to act morally, he will not trust too implicitly to his textbooks, but will examine the morality of the procedure indicated and then act or refrain from acting.
Where induced abortion, abortus provocatus, is the procedure indicated, he will disregard his textbook, and save the mother in some other way, and if there is no other way, he will abandon the case. In the last resort, where nothing whatever can be done to save the mother except abortion, he may not destroy a nascent life directly. It is of the greatest interest to observe that at a certain hospital, out [167] of 1o,ooo deliveries in six years, there were 25 cases of hyperemesis gravidarum, in most of which-and five were almost on the verge of dissolution-the textbooks would have advised emptying the uterus. In point of fact, all the cases recovered and went to full term, being delivered of healthy living children.
As soon as the human embryo is informed with a rational soul, it is a human being and a person. The distinction between animate and inanimate embryo based only on lapse of time from probable conception, cannot be maintained. There is no foundation for the notion that the female is quickened by the rational soul later than the male, though it seems certain that some time elapses before the chromosomes of the male and female pronuclei unite to form another differentiated cell. So soon as the cells unite vitally the result is a living organism, but it is disputed whether or not this principle of life is a rational soul at the beginning.
2 [ 2 cf. O'Malley, Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation, p. 33 sqq., for an interesting discussion as to the moment when life begins in the fertilized ovum. It is stated by great theologians that the infusion of the rational soul into the fertilized ovum at the moment of fertilization cannot be proved. It is possible that some time elapses. This view was held by S. Thomas (S., I, q. 76, a. 3, ad 3 : q. 118, a. 2, ad 2), and is held today as possible. The fullest treatment of the matter may be found in Reaney's Infusion of the Human Soul.] This consideration does not, however, justify abortions, for they, and all similar procedures, are not resorted to till long after the first days of conception. Equally indefensible is the use of the silver ring or spiral to prevent the fertilized ovum attaching itself to the uterus, and since it is not known when the rational soul is infused, such a procedure will result in destroying a human organism if the soul is present. Abortion is the intentional expulsion of an inviable fetus. Normally, the fetus cannot live outside the womb before the seventh month of gestation is completed; exceptionally, it can be kept alive if expelled shortly after the sixth month. Expulsion of the fetus between the seventh and the ninth month is premature birth or acceleration of birth, not [168] abortion. When parturition is likely to be impossible or very troublesome, recourse is had to 1. Abortion, namely, the expulsion of an embryo or fetus that cannot live outside the womb. 2. Premature birth, or the expulsion of a viable fetus. 3. Feticide, or the destruction of the fetus in utero. 4. Caesarean section, namely, the incision of the uterus and the extraction of the fetus. 5. Employment of the forceps.
Principles
1.It is never allowed directly, i.e., by direct means, nor intentionally, i.e., with deliberate intent, to kill the human product in utero, nor on emergence from the uterus, however undeveloped it may be, for any reason whatever, nor to procure abortion of the living fetus with the deliberate intent to do so, or by using means that have abortion for their natural and inevitable result. No motive can justify these two actions, not even the motive of saving the life of the mother, for evil may never be done that good may ensue, the moral evil in the case being the deliberate extinction of an unoffending life. English law condones therapeutic abortion, but without warrant, for the fiction that the fetus is not a person is a pure fiction without foundation in fact.
The Church, through the Holy Office (May 28, 1884; Aug. 19, 1889; July 24, 1895; May 4, 1898; March 5, 1902) , has made it quite clear that craniotomy and every other operation that directly kills the fetus are forbidden. The formula used in the first decree, viz., tuto doceri non posse--i.e., that it cannot be safely taught that craniotomy [169] is permissible--condemns feticide in point of fact. The Sacred Congregation has not, as some have wrongly thought, left any ground for the distinction between what cannot be safely taught in Catholic schools and what in practice can be morally done. The arguments of writers before the decree was published, namely, that in cases of abortion at least, the mother merely ceased to preserve the fetus in its natural environment but did nothing positively to kill it, are inconclusive, and even at the time the plea was considered to be a distinction without a difference. The result of condoning abortion in extreme cases leads, as experience proves, to a too facile recourse to abortions and feticides on a large scale.
Those who procure abortion, the mother included, incur excommunication (c. 2350); those also are included who order the abortion, and those who are effectual or necessary co--operators in it. Grave fear and, of course, ignorance of the penalty, excuses from the penalty. It is to be observed that mere intention does not suffice for incurring the penalty; actual abortion must have taken place.
2. But indirect abortion is another matter. In this, as in all cases where the principle of two effects of the one cause can be validly applied, many actions may rightly be done, the secondary effect of which is abortion, not intended, but foreseen and permitted. Thus, if a mother is in serious danger of death, she may take medicines or submit to treatment on herself necessary for her recovery and directly conducive to it, even if, at the same time, the fetus is ejected or dies in utero, provided that this unfortunate physical evil effect is not intended, and provided that it is guarded against as far as possible, and that nothing is done to induce it directly, i.e., by direct action on the fetus.
The mother is not forbidden to have recourse to such remedies, even though the fetus should die in utero, for its baptism can be secured by doctor or midwife, and in any case, if the mother is allowed to die, the infans in utero dies too, almost instantaneously, if not before the mother. Thus also, the entire uterus may, in certain diseases, be excised, if necessary, even though it contain a living inviable fetus.
[170] The death of the fetus need never be intended, nor is the method employed a method of killing the fetus; it is a method of saving the mother first, with the incidental result of the death of the fetus. How different such cases are from directly intended abortion and craniotomy a very little thought will show. 3. It will be obvious that as a pregnant mother may not permit direct abortion, so she may not perform actions that are calculated to provoke it, such as the taking of strong purgatives, very hot baths, jumping, riding, electric massage, and numerous other methods of stimulating the contractile muscles of the uterus. All these methods must be avoided, as also every other action which is known to have a serious and direct influence in producing abortion. But Nature is so tenacious of nascent life, that the fetus defies many attempts at its expulsion--in normal cases--except those which are violent. Actions which are done with the intention of expelling the fetus, even though in the event ineffectual, are sinful.
It has been maintained by a few writers who have considered the matter, that in hydramnios cases, it is not direct abortion if the bag is ruptured in the case of an inviable child, when abortion is threatened and the membranes are protruding. It may be possible, in some situations, to drain off a very small amount of fluid without danger of abortion, a matter for doctors to decide, but to drain off' all or most of it, is so fatal to an inviable fetus that it could not be justified, though some few authors would permit it in the extreme and imminent danger of the mother's life; but it must here be observed that the mother's life may not be saved by the direct and intended termination of the pregnancy. In case of doubt, when the mother's life is in danger and the attendant cannot determine whether the fetus is alive [171] or not, if it is highly improbable that the fetus is living, it may be treated as dead; but this does not mean that the life of a probable fetus may ever be sacrificed to the rights of the mother, for it is not permissible to invade the probable rights to life of another person. Premature delivery of a viable fetus is permissible for a grave reason but on condition that the lives of mother and child are safeguarded, as far as possible.
A woman who has had willing intercourse commits a serious sin by expelling the male element. This is constructive onanism. If rape has been committed on her, she may do so, if she act before probable conception, for the man was an aggressor, and if she may force him to interrupt the unjust act, she may interrupt the effect of his act, provided she do not interrupt a life. It cannot be stated with any certainty how soon conception takes place after congress; it may be hours or days, for the fertilizing male element has to travel the whole length of the uterus and along the fallopian tube until it meets an ovule. The rate of progression is said to be 0.05--0.15 mm. per second. Even after fusion, impregnation is not instantaneous.
SECTION 10. The Ectopic Embryo 1. The Facts
Ectopic gestation means pregnancy of a fetus or embryo outside the uterus. Fetus is a term employed when we speak of a human being as it is from the end of the fourth week of pregnancy to birth. Embryo is the name given to the undifferentiated product of conception from the second to the fourth week after fertilization. Ovum is the term used for the fertilized female ovule up to the second week of gestation.
It is generally thought that the female ovule is fertilized by the male element in the fallopian tube. The end ofthis tube farthest from the uterus is fringed and shaped like a funnel, called the ampulla. One of the fringed ends, the fimbria ovarica, is longer than the others, and forms a shallow [172] gutter which extends to the ovary. The ovary supplies the ovules which burst from the surface of the ovary. Normally, the ovule travelling down the fallopian tube toward the uterus, either by the peristaltic action of the tube or by the action of the cilia, small hair like processes within the tube, meets a spermatozoon, the head of which pierces the ovule and sets up fertilization; cell division ensues. It is stated by good authorities that fertilization takes place near the ovary a few hours after intercourse. The fertilized ovum becomes embedded in the membrane of the uterus, which then extends and enfolds the ovum; hence the name, decidua reflexa. As the ovum develops, it is contained in a fluid, the liquor amnii, which itself is enveloped by a membrane, the amnion, entirely fetal and covering the dorsal surface and the sides of the embryo. Another membrane enfolds the amnion, called the chorion. The chorion comes into contact with the walls of the uterus, and it is from the chorion and its villi that the fetal part of the placenta is developed. The maternal portion of the placenta is formed from the decidua and is external to the placenta derived from the fetus. The placenta thus consists of three layers: the innermost entirely fetal, the outermost entirely maternal, and an intermediate layer comprising a complex arrangement of fetal villi and maternal sinuses. In normal cases, the fertilized product goes to term and a child is born. Accidentally, however, the fecundated ovum may remain in the tube and develop there. There is then danger of complete rupture of the tube or of tubal abortion; in the latter case, the fetus is expelled through the fimbriated end of the tube into the peritoneal cavity. There is also a danger of a leakage of blood from the burst tube and the formation of blood clot in the pelvic cavity. The bursting of the tube is ordinarily very serious for the mother, and death is likely to ensue, unless an immediate operation is performed. It is a matter for a surgeon to diagnose tubal pregnancy and tubal rupture. The diagnosis of the former is said to be very difficult. But an ectopic may be found, when, for surgical reasons, the abdomen has been opened. The modern practice appears to be to remove [173] the sac and fetus, whether the tube has burst or not, and not to exercise expectant treatment. Any woman, it is stated, while bearing an ectopic fetus is in constant danger of death, but the danger is not always so imminent as to demand immediate operation. It is asserted that 78 per cent of all ectopic gestations result in tubal abortion, and 22 per cent in rupture. The fetus usually dies in each contingency; it may, however, develop in the abdominal cavity outside the uterus, and go to full term. It may die though viable, and after a mock labour will shrivel up, and it is allowed to do so in modern practice, in consequence of the very serious danger to the mother in the endeavour by operation to remove the placenta which adheres to the adjacent organs. Haines found fifty operations for ectopic gestation done after the seventh month of pregnancy with ten maternal deaths. In 1903 Sittner compiled one hundred and fifty--two cases of viable ectopic fetuses. Since then more have been reported. From this account it will readily be seen that ectopic gestation is indefinitely dangerous to the mother, and in the laudable endeavour to save her, the surgeon is confronted with very serious ethical difficulties as to the treatment of a living inviable fetus, that is, if he discover the presence of one.
Surgical Opinion and Procedure
Since the treatment of ectopic pregnancy is a matter for the surgeon in the first instance, it is of great moment to find out what is the surgical opinion on this subject. The opinions of a large number of surgeons in the United States of America were solicited and with great courtesy given. The reason why that country was chosen was that there is a very large Catholic population there, and Catholic opinion is likely to have weight. Besides, with so great a population, it is credible that cases of ectopcs would be numerous.
In collecting opinions, prominent surgeons were interviewed, the precise problem was submitted, letters were sent to Catholic hospitals with the request that replies should be sent by the most capable and most conscientious surgeons [174] on their respective staffs. Less than half the replies came from Catholic surgeons. The problem was stated as follows 1. Catholic ethics permit the removal of a uterus, even during pregnancy, when there is a tumour threatening the life of the mother.
2. In tubal pregnancy, can it be said that there is a pathological condition which threatens the life of the mother, as the uterine tumour does ?
Many of the replies went into a detailed description oftubal pregnancy, its causes, dangers, etc. Forty--one replies were in the affirmative, namely, that tubal pregnancy is a pathological condition; in other words, is a disease. Five of the answers were vague, but seemed to favour the affirmative. Two denied the comparison with tumour of the uterus. One denied that there was a pathological condition in tubal pregnancy. By far the greater number, Catholic and non--Catholic, expressed their firm conviction that tubal pregnancy is not only a pathological condition, but is far more dangerous than cancer of the uterus.
The detailed opinions, exactly as they were received, will be found in the Appendix to this section. There is practically unanimous agreement that an ectopic is always a very serious threat to the life of the mother.
Theological Opinion
In all discussions of this and allied subjects, the reader must bear in mind two replies of the Holy Office which have guided all subsequent theologians in the handling of the problem. In March, 1900, the query was sent to that Congregation : Is it ever permissible to extract from the maternal organs an ectopic fetus, not yet viable, before the sixth completed month after conception? In 1902, the reply was given : No, in accordance with the decree of May 4, 1898, in virtue of which, serious and opportune precaution must be taken, as far as possible, for the lives of fetus and mother; in regard, however, to the time (of operation), let the questioner remember that by virtue of the aforesaid decree, no acceleration of delivery is permissible, unless [175] it is done at such time and in such way that, in accordance with usual contingencies, the lives of mother and fetus are safeguarded. Papal approbation had been given to the decree of 1898. In regard to these replies of the Holy Office, it appears to be the common opinion of theologians that what the reply just cited envisaged and condemned was all direct interference with the ectopic inviable fetus. It is interesting to observe how, in this case, nature herself reinforces moral principles. In one of the classical works on Obstetrics and Gynaecology we read: " In recent years, operators have suggested conservative treatment of the tubes in cases of tubal pregnancy. Some, for example, have dilated the abdominal end of the tube and pressed out the ovum; others have split open the tube and shelled out the ovum from its wall. In the latter case, the wound in the tube is carefully sutured. We have tried this experiment upon several occasions, and in some cases with success. In the majority of cases, however, the oozing of blood is so continuous and difficult to control, that one is afraid to leave the tube behind."
1 What is printed above in italics would certainly, we believe, fall within the condemnation of the Holy Office. It was generally admitted formerly, and it is still admitted even after the replies of the Holy Office, that a diseased pregnant womb that is causing imminent risk to the mother's life may be excised, if excision is really necessary and the only remedy, whether the fetus is inviable or viable, and if all precautions are taken to safeguard, as far as possible, the lives of mother and fetus. This is rightly defended on the principle of the double effect.
It must also be admitted, we believe, on the same reasoning, that a swollen tube, which is causing imminent risk to the mother's life, may be excised, whether the fetus is inviable or viable, provided that the excision is necessary and the only means, and if all precautions are taken to safeguard, as far as possible, the lives of both mother and fetus. The opinion is advanced merely as a probable one. . . . [180] If, according to some writers, it is permissible to treat every ectopic pregnancy, if thought to be very dangerous to the mother, as a tumour that may be removed, it remains to state quite plainly the alleged justification of it, both in view of the decrees of the Holy Office, and as an application of the principle of the double effect. In regard to the positive decrees of the Holy Office forbidding every direct interference with the life of the fetus, it is sufficient to state that theologians commonly hold--with indeed negligible exceptions--that what is forbidden is direct interference with the fetus or embryo, such as would certainly be verified in cases of craniotomy, directly induced abortion, emptying the pregnant womb, or shelling out the embryo or fetus from a pregnant tube, ovary, or cyst. These are all direct attacks on a living fetus, and they are all forbidden.
Secondly, the excision of part of the tube, provided it be granted that it is always a serious peril to the life of the mother, appears to be as much justified as the excision of a dangerously infected pregnant womb that is beyond cure, because in the moral order, as well as in the order of physical causality, the one and only thing aimed at is the excision of the womb, the only purpose being to save the woman's [181] life. The fetus if alive is not attacked except indirectly; its death is not wished, though it is foreseen to be inevitable; the mother is not saved merely by termination of the pregnancy. It is confusion of thought to advance the plea, that when a pregnant tube is excised as a tumour but not as a pregnancy, the distinction is one without a difference, the result being the same in both cases. It is true to say that objectively the result is the same, and so far as physical instruments and surgical operation go, it is indeed a distinction without a difference. But that is not the whole of the matter. In the moral order, it makes a vast difference whether a surgeon intends to remove a pregnancy in the tube, which is not permissible, or to remove a pregnant tube.
It appears possible, therefore, to state the following conclusions 1. It is maintained, on good surgical authority, that an ectopic pregnancy is always a serious threat to the mother's life.
2. A very early ectopic is hardly ever diagnosed and therefore no question arises before actual incision in the vast majority of cases. But if a very early ectopic is suspected, we believe that, before any bleeding takes place, expectant treatment should be employed.
3. Where bleeding or collapse suggest the presence of a dangerous ectopic, it is the surgeon's business, not that of the moralist, to decide upon either expectant treatment or immediate operation.
4. Where the surgeon resorts to operation, if there is a tubal pregnancy, when the tube has burst, it appears morally justifiable to ligate the maternal arteries, even though the fetus will certainly die, if such operation is deemed necessary. Some moralists maintain that the burst portion of the tube with all its contents may be excised.
5. When a surgeon is operating for some disease other than tubal pregnancy, and discovers what he suspects to be an early ectopic in the tube, the moral question arises What may he do, if he thinks that the early ectopic is a serious danger--as it is stated to be--to the mother's life ? [182] We think that he may not open the tubal swelling and shell out its contents, suspected to be a fetus, for this would be a direct attack on a probable fetal life.
Whether or not he may excise that portion of the tube which is swollen, and is thought to contain a living inviable fetus, on that point, there is at present a difference of opinion. Some theologians and most surgeons maintain that since an early ectopic is always a serious threat to the mother's life, excision of the tumour as a tumour is justifiable. But it is obvious that here we are in the realm of facts. The fact in dispute is whether or not every ectopic is a dangerous threat to the mother. Surgical opinion undoubtedly more than inclines to the view that it is. May not the moralist accept this good surgical opinion and solve the difficulty in accordance with it? He cannot do more. He has to rely upon what professional specialists say, and what is more, every case must be dealt with on its own special merits. The moralists who condemn the operation must be very sure of their ground, for they are running counter to a large body of surgical opinion, in a matter that is confessedly obscure, they are asking the Catholic surgeon to run the great risk of either relinquishing all such cases or retiring from his profession. Nurses confronted with such cases in hospitals have their serious problems to face, although in their case the problem is not so acute as it is for the surgeon himself, since theirs is a problem of material co--operation, and not the problem of direct action.
The writer does not claim to settle the matter here discussed. Theologians must await an authoritative reply on it and must be prepared to obey the ruling of the Church on the moral issues involved. Exod. 20, 17) . By the sixth Commandment adultery alone is forbidden explicitly, but all actions which are intended to lead or which naturally lead to it, and all actions contrary to the orderly propagation of the race are implicitly forbidden. By the ninth Commandment all lustful thoughts and desires are forbidden.
SECTION 2. Chastity and Modesty
Both Commandments inculcate the virtue of chastity, and the sixth that of modesty also.
Chastity is the moral virtue that controls in the married and altogether excludes in the unmarried all voluntary expression of the sensitive appetite for venereal pleasure. This pleasure is normally associated as well with the full exercise of the generative function as with the movements of the generative organs as they are preparing to function.
Since chastity moderates appetite, it is part of the virtue of temperance. The object about which the virtue is exercised is fleshly concupiscence, this being understood as the tendency towards the pleasure described above. The organs may function fully, as in the sexual act, or incompletely and inchoatively. The pleasure in the former case is termed complete, in the latter, incomplete venereal or sexual pleasure. The virtue regards both the one and the other.
[201]The rational motive of the virtue of chastity is the reasonableness of controlling sexual appetite in the married and of excluding it in the unmarried, as also of seeking and expressing it in marriage in a rational way, unless the exercise of some higher virtue or more pressing duty justify complete continence, temporary or perpetual, without prejudice to the rights of others. Chastity is a virtue for every state of life. There is a chastity of the married and of the unmarried. Perfect chastity is abstinence, from all expression of the sexual appetite, both in the external act and internal thought, desire and complacency. This virtue connotes a great victory over an imperious appetite. Few persons of adult age are immune from the incitement and allurement of this appetite. The practice of the virtue is usually arduous, is highly meritorious, gives man a great mastery over himself in this respect, and is pleasing to God. Divines have good reason, therefore, for assigning a special aureole to virgins, as they do to martyrs and preachers.
Divine Revelation has enlarged the concept of the value and merit of chastity. In the New Dispensation, a divine seal was put on the ideal of Christian chastity by the sinlessness of Christ our Lord and the virginal maternity of His Blessed Mother. By Revelation we are taught that the body is the temple of the Holy Ghost, and that having been redeemed from sin we are the sons of God, and by the reception of the Holy Eucharist we become united to Christ, fount of purity as of all other virtues. The love of chastity does not lead to a hatred of marriage and, therefore, to an impossible ideal for the many, because marriage was instituted by God as well for the allaying of concupiscence as for the procreation of children.'We must take man as we find him, and man has a fleshly concupiscence that has a legitimate outlet in marriage.Married persons have been canonized by the Church, though it has ever held, in accordance with the teaching of our Lord, that the state of virginity is the higher and nobler state and absolutely more pleasing to God. Since chastity is a great virtue and so valuable [202] an asset to the individual and society--a fact that cannot be denied in view of the appalling troubles, diseases and vices which impurity creates, fosters and multiplies--it will be to our purpose to suggest some means of cultivating and guarding this virtue.
Since ill--health is sometimes an occasion of temptations to unchastity, one obvious physical aid will be the cure of sickness when possible. Other physical aids are : healthy diet in moderation, erring by defect rather than satiety ; abstinence from over--indulgence in calorific foods ; abstinence from alcoholic drink ; the use of clothing that is loose and not too warm ; hard bedding ; cleanliness of body ; moderate exercises that tire but do not fatigue the body ; prudent use of baths ; occupation at definite hours of the day, for it is common experience that work, exercise and mental occupation are safeguards of continence and purity.
Moral education consists in implicit obedience to wise parents and superiors, who know the dangers to which the young are nowadays exposed ; the curbing of curiosity, intemperance and anger ; strict moderation in all gratification of the sensitive appetites ; the practice of positive mortification, such as going without trivial necessaries or pleasant unnecessaries; the avoidance of sloth and of overindulgence in sleep ;the choice of good companions ; the reading of good books; the immediate expulsion of impure phantasies ; emulation in generous rivalry in games and studies; avoidance of what are called soft and sentimental friendships with those of the opposite sex at a comparatively early age, since such friendships induce precocious sexuality which is harmful to health and character ;disapproval of mixed dances between small boys and girls, and much more, the co--education of the sexes close to the age of puberty, if not earlier ; mixed games and camps especially after the age of puberty has been reached ; promiscuous and general friendships between the sexes.
Religious education consists in the appreciation of the virtue of chastity, the abhorrence of impurity as sinful, the conviction that virtue is pleasing to God and vice most [203] displeasing to Him, the cultivation of modesty in all places and at all times, a sincere devotion to one's Angel Guardian, the Blessed Virgin, S. Joseph, frequent reception of the Holy Eucharist, prompt resistance to temptations against chastity, however vehement they may be, sorrow for sins even of frailty, gratitude for victory over temptation, horror of the lax standards of worldly persons who proclaim that chastity is impossible.
It was held for a long time that continence was impossible both for the married and for celibates. Doctors lent their authority without much scruple to the widespread conviction that absolute chastity was dangerous to young men ; at the present time there has been a change of opinion in this respect, and it is admitted, not only by medical opinion but by the majority of the enlightened public, that continence has no dangers provided that it is the physical outcome of a moral attitude. The so--called sexual necessity of young people is often produced artificially through the nervous system under constant stimulation of an erotic nature. Under these stimuli there is increased desire ; on the other hand, desire diminishes, and continence therefore becomes easier, if occasions of this sort and their recall by the mind are sedulously avoided. It is, in fact, chastity of the mind which makes possible and renders easier physical chastity, while immoral thoughts or intentions make it difficult or unbearable.
"To confuse continence and chastity is an error. One who is chaste can be continent without much effort and without disorder ; one who is not chaste can be continent only with great difficulty, and if he achieves it, it is often at the expense of his physical and mental health.It is not chastity which is anomalous, it is continence plus impurity ; that is the real danger, and it is there that we must seek for the causes of nervous disorders which have been wrongly ascribed to continence as such" 1 Modesty, in so far as it is a bulwark of purity, is a special aspect of temperance. It is seen in the external behaviour of one who wishes to preserve himself from the allurements [204] of irrational sexual appetite and the temptations of fleshly concupiscence. It is the decorous inhibition of any act that would induce in oneself or others an incitement to lust.
Since modesty is a virtue, it is a mean between pruriency and prudishness. Modesty in act is expressed as well by reasonable concealment of those parts of the body whose exposure might be an occasion of lustful desire, as by abstaining from all unnecessary touching of those parts and the parts adjoining them. Modesty of the eyes is expressed by abstaining from all prurient and dangerous curiosity. Modesty of speech consists in the avoidance of all suggestive expressions, as they are called, and much more of all gross expressions in the sexual sphere. Modesty of gait in man is the avoidance of effeminate behaviour, and in women, the avoidance of all attitudes that are bold and daring.
Chastity and modesty are also to be defined by their contraries, impurity and immodesty. The distinction between these contraries is of great importance, for impurity is always sinful, whereas immodesty may or may not be. It is not, of course, implied that immodesty, as such, is sometimes excused, but that what are usually called immodest acts, conversations, looks and thoughts may be necessary and, therefore, need not be sinful. A patient who reveals to his doctor sexual troubles or diseases when he ought to reveal them does not sin against modesty, but we have to speak of such revelation as conversation about what is immodest or indelicate, though it is not contrary to the virtue of modesty.
SECTION 3. Impurity

The Object of Impurity
Impurity is often called luxury (Latin: luxuria), but in the present treatment of the subject the word luxury will be avoided, since, in English, it means rich diet or costly dress and has no connotation of impurity.
The sexual appetite is the sensitive appetite for venereal pleasure. The term is used here in that sense alone ; it is not used for the desire of sexual intercourse, for that is [205] desired as a means of gratifying the appetite for venereal pleasure. Impurity has for its object, as already suggested, venereal pleasure, which may be complete in man by the seminal ejaculation, and in woman by the diffusion of vaginal glandular secretions, especially that of the so--called glands of Bartolini; or it may be incomplete when it does not reach that degree, but still is present in the sexual organs, incipient, when the organs are preparing to proceed to the orgasm, full and vehement, when they are about to exert the orgasm. Impurity is, then, defined as the inordinate appetite for or use of venereal movements, that is, inordinate in respect of the good of the species.
Principles concerning the morality of sexual pleasure, solitary or mutual, outside wedlock
All sexual pleasure, outside wedlock, that is directly voluntary is grievously sinful. The term, directly voluntary, implies that this pleasure is intentionally procured or acquiesced in as an end in itself or as a means to some end. The will is directed towards the pleasure as desirable and to be enjoyed. The will is so directed if the pleasure is deliberately procured and evoked, or if it is deliberately accepted when it has arisen spontaneously. Now this pleasure, as already explained, may be complete or incomplete. Both the one and the other are grievously sinful when directly voluntary.
(a) Complete venereal pleasure that is directly voluntary
Complete venereal pleasure is grievously sinful. That it is so, is evident from the following line of argument.
It is contrary to nature's purpose, and seriously so, if this pleasure is sought or accepted outside legitimate sexual intercourse, for the pleasure is annexed to an act that must be employed socially in legitimate wedlock, and not for the individual's gratification outside wedlock, since the obvious and only purpose in nature's, that is, God's, intention is that this pleasure should be experienced in, and should attract to, that mutual act between man and wife, designed [206] by nature for the propagation of the race, whether or not the effect ensue. No other purpose for this pleasure can be rationally assigned, and therefore no use of it outside wedlock can be rational. The result, too, is a matter of immense moment. The result, namely, orderly procreation, can be achieved only in marriage, that is, in the indissoluble and stable union of man and woman for the begetting, the rearing and the education, physical, moral and intellectual of offspring. If, by accident, and by reason of extraneous causes, generation cannot result in a given case, owing for example to sterility, it is still obvious from the reasoning given that man and woman outside wedlock could not, without grievous offence against nature, procure or accept this pleasure, for the reasoning is not based on the actual or possible genesis of offspring, but on the inordination of using a pleasure that has no purpose at all outside wedlock. Extrinsic and accidental circumstances cannot change the intrinsic disorder of an act, and make that indifferent which is in itself unnatural. The reasoning is valid also even if, in the case of fornication, the parents would see to the well--being of the offspring, for though this might be secured in some cases, it would certainly not be secured in general, and dubious paternity would lead to neglect of offspring on a large scale. The possession by man of the power of evoking this pleasure can be explained only in reference to woman as wife and vice--versa.
1 { 1 S. Paul (I Cor. 7, 4) : " The wife hath not control of her own body but the husband ; the husband likewise hath not control of his own body, but the wife."} It would be the same in the case of vision. If all light were extinguished, there would be no use for the eye. If the eye has no other purpose at all except to see, it is clear that nature, that is, God, endowed man with eyes for that purpose alone. Since, therefore, sexual pleasure has no purpose at all except in reference to the sexual act between man and wife, it would be a perversion of nature for an individual to use that pleasure outside wedlock. Therefore, as directly voluntary sexual pleasure outside wedlock is a perversion of nature in a grave matter, it is clear that this pleasure [207] directly procured outside wedlock is a grievous offence against nature and is a grievous sin.
A valid argument may also be derived from consequences, namely, that if it were permissible to procure or accept sexual pleasure outside wedlock, there would be little or no inducement to many men and women to undertake the burdens of married life. Solitary defilements and fornications, as well as other sexual irregularities would take the place of marriage in a vast number of cases, and would, therefore, tend to the destruction of the race and the neglect of the due rearing of offspring. It may be admitted that some love marriages, as they are called, might take place, but the number would be negligible. The same argument is valid against what are called companionate marriages, that is, temporary concubinage for appeasing the sexual urge in young men and women, with the added immoral implication that State instruction should be given to the parties to prevent conception. Both terms of the suggestion are a perversion of nature.
The reasons set out above are ethical. The Moral theologian may add, as further and theological arguments, the following. The unanimous opinion of divines on the subject is a clear indication of the teaching of the Church. There has been no variation in this teaching. The doctrine was crystallized in the condemnation by Pope Innocent XI of the contrary opinions, which maintained that fornication is wrong only because it is forbidden not because it is essentially evil, and that pollution is not forbidden by Natural law. Furthermore, Onan was punished with death because he was guilty of sexual self--defilement, and employed it as a sinful means of evading the Levirate law of raising offspring to his deceased brother (Gen. 38, g), for death was not the penalty for refusal to obey this law (Dent. 25, 7).
(b) Incomplete venereal pleasure that is directly voluntary
Hitherto, we have treated of complete venereal pleasure outside wedlock, and have proved its grave sinfulness. It is necessary now to prove that incomplete venereal pleasure, directly voluntary, is also grievously sinful. [208] (i) The ethical argument Even the smallest degree of incomplete venereal pleasure . has reference by its very nature to legitimate sexual intercourse and to that alone. No other purpose can be rationally assigned to it. If, then, such pleasure be procured or accepted with no reference to its only purpose, a serious perversion of nature has taken place, for the purpose of nature, that is, of God, in giving mankind the capability of this pleasure is that man and woman may be attracted to the mutual office of propagating the race. It is, therefore, a perversion of nature that man or woman should procure even this incomplete pleasure for their solitary gratification. In the capability of arousing this pleasure, the individual must apprehend, what indeed is the fact, that the capability is his only that he may be subordinated to the species. The power is given for a definite purpose, and for that only; his subjection to the divine purpose is manifest, for God has given definite capacities to man that a divine plan may be realized.
It must be admitted that the gravity of the smallest degree of this pleasure was not always taught by all writers. S. Alphonsus cites some authors who held that there could be venial matter in directly voluntary incomplete sexual pleasure outside wedlock. The Salmanticenses, a in a lengthy treatment of the subject, give the full weight to the arguments that were alleged in its favour. There appeared at one time to be some extrinsic probability for the milder opinion. Fumo, de Soto, Martinus de Magistris, Ledesma, Araujo, Zanardi, Marchant admitted it. When the matter was further discussed, authors rightly distinguished between venereal pleasure and pleasure that was sensitive but not truly venereal. The distinction was clearly pointed out by Filliucci, Lacroix, Bauny, Escobar, Tamburini. But the question as a fact is whether all incomplete venereal pleasure outside wedlock that is directly voluntary is always a grievous sin? All authors now hold that it is. For the Moral theologian the discussion is now closed, both on account of the intrinsic [209] reasons for the view and in consequence of unanimous agreement, so that no writer could now venture to call it in question.
(ii) The theological argument
Every venereal movement, as such, has an essential relation to the complete conjugal act, that is, to the complete sexual act which is legitimately exercised in marriage, for every venereal movement is the natural inception of and preparation for it. Now all venereal pleasure that is sought outside marriage destroys that relation, and transfers to the good (i.e., the pleasure) of the individual what is designed for the good (i.e., the perpetuation) of the race. This violation of that necessary relation to the race is intrinsically and seriously evil, precisely because it is the inversion of an essential order or relation. The individual who, outside legitimate marriage, seeks or accepts this venereal pleasure for his own satisfaction, is exercising an act as an individual that should be an act on behalf of the race. He is violating that subordination to the race which he should maintain. The relation that a man has to the race, in respect of the permanence of the race, is absolutely necessary and essential to the race. There is an order established between the individual and the race. By every act of seeking or accepting venereal pleasure outside legitimate marriage, that order and that relation are completely destroyed.
It will be obvious that if some necessary and essential relation is wholly destroyed by acts, there is no need to consider degrees in these acts. Each is a grievous inordination. Slight violations of duty in regard to charity, obedience, or justice, leave those virtues substantially intact, but in every use of venereal pleasure outside marriage, there is a complete inversion of an essential and necessary order or relation. The difference between this inordination and that of lying-which is also opposed to the order of [210] society-will be obvious, when it is remembered that unchastity is subversive of both the essential and necessary order of society, whereas society could persist in spite of lying. Truthfulness does not preserve the human race, but generation of offspring in wedlock does. The Holy Office (1661) in reply to the question: Is a venial sin possible in the case of solicitation of a penitent by a confessor?-stated that in matters of impurity venial sin is not possible. Popes Clement VIII and Paul V ordered those to be denounced to the Inquisitors of the Faith who held that kissing, embracing and touching for the sake of venereal pleasure are not grievous sins. Pope Alexander VII condemned the proposition which stated that it is probable that a venial sin only is committed by kissing for the sake of the carnal and sensual pleasure that ensues, even though the danger of further consent and of pollution be absent. It appears to follow that there can be some incomplete venereal pleasure that is a grievous sin. Since this must be admitted in view of the condemned opinion, it follows that all incomplete venereal pleasure directly voluntary (outside wedlock) is a grievous sin, for in the moral sphere, this pleasure, of which we speak, is not the less venereal because it is slight. In the case of theft, there can be a greater or a lesser act of injustice, whereas the inordination in the venereal pleasure, of which we speak, is always the same, namely, it is subversive of the good of the race and precisely in the same way.
From what has been stated, two conclusions follow, namely, that it is grievously sinful in the unmarried deliberately to procure or to accept even the smallest degree of true venereal pleasure ; secondly, that it is equally sinful to think, say, or do anything with the intention of arousing even the smallest degree of this pleasure. It may be objected that one cannot know when the smallest degree of such pleasure is present. In default of such consciousness it is clear that formal sin will not be committed, for sin cannot be committed without advertence. It is also [211] true that the beginnings of such pleasure, if very slight indeed, defy analysis, for they hardly enter within consciousness. Moral principles are, however, not laid down for what is elusive. They are laid down for true human acts. If, in fact, pleasure that is venereal arises, however slightly, and its presence is realized, there then exists matter of grievous sin for the unmarried. If such pleasure has been deliberately provoked or accepted, a grievous sin has been committed, at least materially. The sin will be formal if it is realized to be a grave sin. This fact is expressed by saying that in the matter of venereal pleasure there is no venial or morally slight amount.
It may, however, seem strange that in this matter, so common and alluring to mankind, the point at which grievous sin becomes possible is reached so soon. But, in point of fact, the consequences of indulging in this incomplete venereal pleasure are so fatal to the race, that on rational grounds alone we are forced to conclude that since the effects of it would be so dreadful and inevitable, this abuse of a natural function must be seriously inordinate. The smallest amount of this pleasure is an inducement to indulgence in the fullest amount of it. Here again we must take people as we find them, and what is stated is true of mankind taken in the bulk. If a small amount of deliberate venereal pleasure outside wedlock were permitted, general defilement would ensue, to the grievous harm of the race. No ordinary man or woman could say that they would indulge in the small amount and then desist, for in their own despite they would expose themselves to actual pollution and it would take place. It is, therefore, true to say, and this is the opinion of all divines and is Catholic teaching, that from the first beginnings of venereal pleasure through its progressive development to the complete issue, there is all the time matter of serious inordination and sin, if we speak only of the unmarried.
But it has to be observed that this doctrine deals with [212] objective facts, and it is quite another question whether formal sin is always committed. To determine this in a particular case it is necessary to take into account the moral training of the agent, his habits, his passions, his concupiscence, his good faith and his subjective conscience. But such factors have no bearing on what is true in point of fact. A man with honourable but misguided intentions may be guilty of grave excesses and injustice.
It will be seen, therefore, how important the distinction is between immodesty and impurity strictly so called. The former may be grievous, venial or no sin at all ; the latter, understood in its strict sense, as explained, and in the unmarried, is always a grievous sin.
The subject hitherto treated has been venereal pleasure that is directly voluntary ; but such pleasure may not have been the direct object of the will, either as an end in itself or as a means to some other end. When this pleasure is foreseen as certain or likely to arise from some free action or thought, but is not itself directly willed, it is then willed indirectly or in its cause. It is important to determine to what extent such indirectly voluntary pleasure is imputable and sinful, and to what extent and under what circumstances the causes that produce it must be avoided or discontinued. That there is good ground for discussing its morality will be evident from two examples. If a doctor, nurse, or student of moral principles, foresees that complete venereal pleasure will certainly result in consequence of the necessary duties which they have to perform, it is obvious that this result may be permitted and its likely insurgence disregarded, no consent being given to it when it does ensue. In such cases there will be no sin at all. If, on the contrary, a youth read an obscene book without any justification whatever, foreseeing from past experience that complete venereal pleasure will arise in him as a consequence, it is obvious that he sins by exposing himself to such a result. On this all are agreed. It is a real inordination against nature to set in motion the causes of pollution without any justification, even if no consent be given to it when it ensues. Consequently, indirectly voluntary venereal pleasure may or [213] may not be sinful. The point is of considerable importance and principles must be stated as clearly as possible.
A cause is said to have, of its nature, a serious influence in producing venereal pleasure when it generally produces that effect in normally constituted persons.
A cause which sometimes produces this result but rarely in normal persons is said to be a remote or a slight cause in the nature of causes. It will be explained in the section on external modesty, and more fully in the section for the use of confessors, what causes are considered serious, what slight. These causes are the various acts of immodesty. The subject will not be fully treated here in the vernacular. Ordinarily, Catholic training and instinct will help one to discriminate. In doubt, the penitent will ask the confessor. More detailed knowledge is required in the latter, for he may be called upon to teach as well as to admonish his penitents.
A cause that would be serious in most persons might be accidentally slight in the case of one not easily moved to sexual feelings owing to habit or temperament, and viceversa, a naturally slight cause might have a serious effect in one who is hypersexual.
In judging of the moral imputability of putting a cause that will or may produce venereal pleasure, we are assuming the absence of desire for the pleasure, since that would be a grievous sin in the unmarried, and the absence both of consent and of the proximate danger of it when the pleasure has arisen, since to consent or to expose oneself to the proximate danger of consent would be a grievous sin.
(c) Complete venereal pleasure that is indirectly voluntary 1. Complete venereal pleasure (pollution in man or woman), voluntary in its cause, is a grievous sin when the cause of it, within the sexual sphere, is put without a grave reason that would justify the cause being put, and when at the same time it is such as to have, by its nature, a serious influence in producing the effect. Thus, certain actions [214] would undoubtedly produce in normal persons complete pollution, and certain other actions, if protracted, would normally produce the same effect. The reason for this principle is that to put a cause of a definite effect, foreseeing the effect to be certain or likely to ensue, and to do so without reason, is implicitly to wish and, indeed, to intend the effect. Such acts must, therefore, be avoided under grave obligation.
2. When there is a good legitimate reason, such as necessity or great utility, for putting or protracting such a cause, the effect is not imputable as a sin, provided that the effect is not directly intended nor consent given to it, nor likely to be given to it, when it ensues. When consent is given oftener than not, the danger of giving consent is proximate ; when consent is rarely given, the danger may be considered remote. Thus, doctors, nurses and students may find themselves in circumstances where they are obliged or find it extremely useful to put such causes, with a legitimate intention, and without proximate danger of consent should pollution take place.
They may do so and disregard the consequences. The principle has no application to the case of one who, wishing to be rid of vehement venereal sensations, puts a cause in order that pollution may result, for the effect in such a case is intended in itself.
3. When the full effect is foreseen as most likely or certain to arise from curious and dangerous reading, such as the not altogether necessary study of physiology, anatomy and kindred subjects, it is probable that a grievous sin is not committed, for it cannot be said that the effect is wholly willed in its cause, assuming, of course, that the effect is voluntary only in its cause, i.e., foreseen, permitted but not wished, and that when the effect ensues, consent is not given to it. But we have to guard against delusions in such matters.
4. Complete venereal pleasure, not intended but foreseen as likely or even certain to ensue from a given act, is not a grave sin but is probably a venial sin, if it arise from an [215] unnecessary act, which, in the sexual sphere, has, of its nature, only a slight (remote) influence in producing the effect. It is assumed that no consent is given. The reason for this principle is that the effect is evil in the degree in which the cause is evil.
When a cause, in itself a slight one, is persisted in without sufficient reason, and incomplete venereal pleasure is already present to which consent is not given, there is obviously some danger of the complete pleasure ensuing. Though it is probable that the obligation of desisting at once is not a grave one, nevertheless, it must not be forgotten that to continue may involve the danger of consent.
5. From ordinary actions, not sinful, that are altogether outside the sexual sphere, as, riding, swimming, physical exercises, there may ensue at times complete venereal pleasure. These actions have only an accidental causality in the production of such an effect. Provided there is no desire for the pleasure, or the effect, and no consent to it if it arises, nor any proximate danger of consent, these results are not imputable as sins against chastity, for the cause put is naturally insufficient. But if pollution is imminent and can easily be checked, not to try to check it will be a venial sins 6. If foreseen, but not intended, complete venereal pleasure ensue from some act outside the sexual sphere that is a grievous sin, such as drunkenness, it is held that a venial sin against chastity is committed, since the effect is foreseen and allowed without any reason 4 ; if the act is a venial sin outside the sexual sphere, it is probable that a venial sin against chastity is committed. It is assumed that there is neither desire for nor consent to the effect. The reader will, of course, observe that we are here speaking of indirectly voluntary unchastity, not of that which is directly voluntary. The distinction is very important.
7. Complete venereal pleasure that would be voluntary [216] only in its cause has to be prevented from arising under a greater obligation than the pleasure that is incomplete ; a more serious reason is required for permitting the former than the latter, both because the former is a greater inordination against nature and the danger of consent is greater. Outside wedlock, incomplete venereal pleasure that is directly voluntary, deliberately excited, or accepted when it has arisen, is grievously sinful, however slight its degree.
When it is involuntary.
When this pleasure is involuntary both in its cause and in itself it is not sinful.
When it is voluntary only in its cause.
(a) If there was a good reason for putting the cause which aroused this pleasure, and it was neither desired nor consented to, no sin is committed.
(b) Even if there was not any sufficient reason for putting such a cause, the incomplete venereal pleasure is not grievously imputable, because if, in fact, it has arisen, there was no intention of arousing it, and no danger of consent to it when aroused, two conditions that are here supposed to exist.
(e) The duty of resisting sexual pleasure
When sexual movements are slight they may generally be disregarded, for innumerable trivial causes produce them. Continual apprehension about them and their many causes will serve only to keep the mind on the strain and would inevitably augment their vehemence. Disregard of them will be a sufficient antidote as a rule. In the case of those who are more easily and oftener excited, a more vigorous disregard and displeasure, without mental anxiety, will be necessary. Acceptance of venereal pleasure, even when its cause is non--voluntary, would be a grievous sin. When the movements and concomitant physical pleasure [217] are vehement, there is a grave obligation to resist them in some way if there is a proximate danger of consent to them. This can be known only from experience. Positive physical and direct forcible resistance is usually not to be recommended, for thereby the motions are sometimes increased. Indirect resistance is sufficient when the motions do not subside by disregarding them. This indirect resistance may be external, as when one changes position, place or occupation, or inflicts pain on the body. It is internal, when the mind is diverted by spiritual or secular preoccupations, or acts of virtue are elicited, or the determination not to sin is renewed. Usually this internal resistance is sufficient, but the mind must be kept tranquil.
But this positive resistance may be omitted for a just reason, as when it is found that the movements are more easily quietened and more rarely arise, if they are disregarded rather than positively resisted, or if the temptation persists a long time, and it is too great a strain to go on exercising a positive resistance.' In this case, as there is a just reason for passivity, one may be sure that divine grace will be granted to help the will not to consent. The reader will, of course, observe that passivity of will is not consent. The text does not imply that passivity means that all resistance to temptation may be given up and sin committed.
In those cases where the movements are due to some voluntary and unnecessary act that is not sinful, resistance consists in removing the cause.
If such movements arise from necessary or useful actions, they need not deter one from acting. Therefore, prayer should not be given up, nor frequent Holy Communion abandoned, merely because improper phantasms appear then most of all to insinuate themselves into the imagination. Persons of a highly sensitive temperament are sometimes beset with these phantasms, or even with bodily venereal motions, in the most prosaic or the most sacred circumstances, or they experience them in thinking of the Saints, of the love of God, of the mystical union in the Sacrament. Their burden is great and they may be considered as subjects [218] for medical treatment. The confessor will help them, not so much by sympathizing, as by urging them to be sensible and not to be misled by sentimental feelings. If the phantasms and bodily disturbances persist, these penitents must disregard them ; they may be told not to confess them as sins, not to speak of them, never to fall into pride, but humbly submit to the trial.
SECTION 4. External Sins against Chastity
The natural consummated external sins against chastity are called natural because the sexual function is not perverted but is used in the normal way. These sins are fornication, adultery, incest, rape, abduction. The unnatural consummated sins against chastity are pollution, sodomy and bestiality; in these, the natural function is perverted and abused.
The unconsummated sins against chastity are those which fall short of the full sexual act and connote incomplete physical venereal pleasure, procured or accepted willingly. Authors sometimes include in this category of unconsummated sins against chastity all external acts against modesty. But since chastity and modesty regard entirely different objects, the latter will be dealt with separately.
SECTION 5. Internal Sins against Chastity
The internal sins against chastity are three ; voluntary sinful immodest phantasms, volitional complacency in represented sins against chastity, and unchaste desires.
Thoughts or Phantasms
Immodest thoughts, strictly speaking, are phantasms of immodest objects. They, like immodesty of all kinds, are not, in themselves, sinful, but they are capable of arousing venereal pleasure.
The purely intellectual consideration of unchaste actions, such as the speculative consideration as to what constitutes adultery, fornication or incest, is not sinful. Such purely mental processes must take place in the Law Courts, in the [219] confessional, and in writing and reading treatises such as the present one. But when this process is joined, as ordinarily it must be joined, with imaginative phantasms of the several sins in their physical aspects, it is possible that the thoughts may arouse sexual pleasure. The morality of entertaining such phantasms is here considered.
1. Immodest thoughts or phantasms entertained with lustful intent, that is, with the motive of deriving pleasure in the venereal delectation which they do or may arouse, is a grievous sin. Their sinfulness consists both in the intention and in the actual fact of consenting to the pleasure.
2. To neglect to dispel immodest thoughts that arouse only slight sexual feelings, if the thoughts are entertained from levity, curiosity or sloth in putting them away, is a venial sin, provided there is no evil desire and provided no consent is given to the pleasure.
3. Immodest phantasms should indeed be dispelled at once. If, however, they persist, and cannot be dispelled without considerable trouble and anxiety, there is no sin owmmitted so long as no consent is given. Those persons who are the unwilling victims of persistent impure phantasms may be reassured that they do not commit sin. They should cease to be over--anxious, since anxiety keeps the mind on the strain. They should quietly and firmly turn to other thoughts, especially to prayer. In circumstances where these evil phantasms are inevitable, the victim of them should proceed about his work as if the thoughts did not exist. Candid manifestation to a confessor will be a great help. At all costs, the victim should never become dejected, for dejection is a snare of the devil.
4. To excite immodest phantasms from desire of lust is grievously sinful, as also if, from the nature of the phantasm, a person knowingly exposes himself to the proximate danger of consent to venereal pleasure ; otherwise a venial sin will be committed if there is not a sufficient reason for evoking the phantasm. No sin will be committed if there is a sufficient reason for doing so. Therefore, the positive [220] obligation of rejecting impure and useless phantasms is not a grave one except in so far as the proximate danger of consent to insurgent venereal pleasure is to be removed. The danger will normally be removed by an interior act of dissent once or twice in the same temptation." 5. To entertain such thoughts for a good moral reason is not sinful, even though they may produce venereal pleasure, consent to which is withheld.
6. All immodest thoughts, as such, i.e., if they are not desires nor approval of sin, would be of the same specific moral species, if they all have the one aim and result, namely, to excite venereal pleasure. It is the pleasure alone that is then the ultimate object of the will. The confessor should not ask penitents what the subject of the thought was, apart from desires and complacency, for that is immaterial. The confession of bad thoughts includes, as may be supposed, the confession of intention of deriving pleasure from them, or the actual pleasure taken. The only point to explain or to understand is the gravity of the thoughts. When, however, pollution, if sinful, has taken place, it would have to be confessed as an additional sin ; it is not confessed by confession merely of bad thoughts.
Deliberate Complacency
This internal act of the will consists in the volitional approval of some specific sin as represented by the imagination. It has no necessary reference to sexual pleasure aroused. In this, as in all other matters, the sin is the approval of what is sinful.
Deliberate complacency in any sin of impurity is of the same species and gravity as is the sin represented and approved, for the sinful object is the object of the will. Thus, complacency in imagined adultery--prescinding from desire for it-is a grievous sin against chastity and justice both.
This deliberate complacency is not usually concerned with the differentiating circumstances of the sinful object.
[221] Thus, complacency in adultery and fornication is usually one and the same specific complacency, for the circumstance of marriage does not usually enter into the object of complacency. If any specific sinful circumstance, as a fact, has entered into the act of complacency, that circumstance would have entered into the specific sinfulness of the act, if it has a specific morality. Thus, complacency in represented adultery, because it is such, contracts the specific sinfulness of adultery. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that such circumstances do not normally enter into the act of complacency. Deliberate complacency can easily shade off into inefficacious desire, which is a different sin.
It is right that the confessor should sometimes ask if any desires were fostered, and if they were, what their object was. Similarly, complacency in an obscene object represented differs from the consent to the sexual pleasure aroused. It is also right that a confessor should ask if consent was given to consequences. But it will often be prudent to omit such questions, for these distinctions are not very obvious to ordinary penitents.
Evil Desires
These desires have for their object the doing of an evil act. Since the inefficacious desire of doing what is evil does not differ morally from the desire that is efficacious, the distinction need not trouble confessor or penitent.
An unchaste desire is sinful to the same extent and in the same degree as the object desired : " But I say to you, that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her hath already committed adultery with her in his heart " (Mt. 5, 28).
Impure desires, as all other evil desires, contract the specific sinfulness of the circumstances of the object, for the object is a concrete one, and the will is drawn to it as it is. Thus, the desire of adultery is worse than the desire of fornication. The confessor may rightly ask what was the object of evil desires, but he should avoid doing so if scandal is likely.
[222] SECTION 6. External Immodesty
Custom and Convention
External immodest acts are reducible to looks and touches. Other external acts that arouse sexual pleasure, as immodest conversation, reading and singing, do so indirectly; that is, through the medium of thoughts which they suggest. .All Moral theologians have to take into consideration the different parts of the human body in respect of their influence, when touched or exposed to view, in arousing libidinous excitation. The distinction between part and part is reasonable and is endorsed by conventions among all civilized peoples. To those whose business it is to see nature close at hand, one part of the body is very much the same as any other part, so far as they are affected by the sight of or contact with them. But in the case of others, speaking in general, the organs of generation and adjacent parts, when touched or gazed upon, are apt to arouse sexuality, whereas other parts have not the same effect. Nevertheless, they may do so and are calculated to do so if the exposure is excessive and unusual and contrary to the customs and conventions of a given place. The parts of the body whose exposure normally arouses sexuality are termed the unbecoming parts, for they are normally concealed. But customs differ in different countries, so that it would be exaggerated to lay down general rules for all indiscriminately. The face, hands and feet are so completely exposed in nearly every country that the sight of them does not cause any trouble except in the morbid and in perverts for whom general principles are of no avail. What is customary does not affect us.If, therefore, in course of time, the prevailing present custom in this country for women and girls to expose a good deal more of their bodies than was usual in former times becomes a universal practice, such exposure will cease to trouble men, and it may not be so necessary then, as we believe it now is, to speak of the present amount of exposure as unbecoming, dangerous and immodest. But the tendency of all civilized peoples has been in the direction of external [223] modesty, so that the extreme fashions now in vogue may be only a temporary phase and will not have succeeded in breaking down the appreciation of the fact that modesty is woman's best adornment.
Immodesty as Object in the Moral Sphere
No act of immodesty, strictly speaking, is, in itself, either morally good or morally evil. Its moral aspect depends on various extrinsic circumstances. But all acts of immodesty have a natural tendency to excite to sexuality owing to human concupiscence. Experience proves that immodesty arouses venereal pleasure or entails the danger of its insurgence, and when it is aroused, there is the possibility of consent to it. Since that possibility may arise, it is precisely that relation which can make immodesty morally evil, when, that is to say, it is morally evil to expose oneself or others needlessly to the danger of the insurgence of sexual. pleasure. The virtue of modesty safeguards the virtue of chastity by inclining one to close all avenues to impurity, and immodesty is undoubtedly a broad avenue. When modesty is violated, the way is prepared for impurity. Furthermore, since immodest acts produce normally a certain sensitive--and very often a venereal--gratification, it is very easy, through immodesty, for the judgment to be disturbed, and for one to suppose that what really proceeds from the desire of lust is merely an indifferent act, or a useful one. In reference to others, immodesty done in their presence evinces a tendency to lust and acts as an incitement to it. Immodesty, therefore, has to be avoided, chiefly owing to the danger of unchastity. Where there is no danger of sexual pleasure arising from immodesty, actions contrary to modesty are sins of sensuality, but not sins against chastity. I Solitary acts of immodesty indulged in for the sake of the concomitant or ensuing venereal pleasure do not specifically differ from one another, for their inordination consists in procuring, or wishing to procure, or in accepting that pleasure. How that pleasure was stimulated, whether by this or that particular means, or this and that sense, is [224] irrelevant. Confessors will, therefore, check penitents who attempt to describe in detail the means by which they procured the sinful pleasure if it was solitary. It is obvious that acts of immodesty differ specifically from sins of impurity. The latter are not confessed by confessing the former, though a confessor may often legitimately presume that by immodesty an uninstructed penitent means a sin of impurity.
Motive in Immodesty
Immodest acts, however slight they may be, that are done from the motive of exciting lust, even though it do not ensue, are grievous sins.
When immodesty is indulged in from curiosity or playfulness, and therefore perfunctorily, it is usually a venial sin.
When bodily exposure or acts are permitted for a sufficient reason, no sin is committed, even should venereal pleasure arise, to which no consent is given. But a grave reason is required for those acts which more readily and normally excite sexual motions, and consequently necessity alone would excuse many actions in this sphere, such as those which have to be done to patients by nurses and doctors.
Immodesty differentiated by its Object
Just as adultery, incest, fornication differ specifically and must be severally confessed, so the immodest touching of another is determined in its moral aspect by the circumstances of that other. Thus, the immodest sinful touching of a married woman differs in its moral aspect from the same touching of the unmarried. Sinful immodesty with a female differs from that with a male. But the specific sinfulness must be intended that it may be morally incurred, for it is possible that in many cases the only aim intended is personal venereal gratification without any wish, desire for, or complacency in anything more. But the sin of scandal will always be an added sin, and that of injustice, in sins with married persons. [225] Immodest gazing at others may be morally differentiated by the kind of person looked at. It would indeed be so if desire of touching or of the consummated act were added. It is held by some authors that difference of sex in this matter constitutes difference of sin; this may be so in some cases, but it is not necessarily so in all, for specific difference of sin would depend on the interior act of desire or complacency.
The Circumstance of concomitant Danger
Immodest acts done without the explicit and direct intention of exciting personal venereal pleasure--for this would be a grievous sin--must be judged, as to their moral aspect, by reference to the danger which they create of arousing venereal movements and pollution. They are to be judged in respect of their power of inciting the will to consent to the effects, where the effect is incomplete pleasure, and of their power to produce actual ,pollution, a gross inordination. Those immodest actions are, therefore, to be avoided under grave obligation which, of their nature and for a particular individual, can be said to excite to pollution, or proximately and notably to sexual motions, consent to which is likely. Those are to be avoided under at least light obligation which, of their nature and for a particular individual, have only a remote and slight power of doing so. Only the most general statements can be made as to what acts excite to lust notably, and what do so only slightly. Men are of such different complexions in this matter that what is true of one stage of life is not true of another ; and custom, moral education, mental training, public opinion, conventions and fashion make an immense difference. Nevertheless, the following considerations will help to a just discrimination. To specify with any degree of plausibility the influence that certain acts have in exciting to sexual movements, we must consider the character of the acts, their circumstances, and the temperament of the agent.
Generally speaking, acts differ in their power of exciting to those movements, for some do so of their nature and [226] practically universally, and that to a great degree, whilst other acts excite only very slightly. Furthermore, acts that would not of themselves greatly excite will do so if repeated or protracted, and more especially if they are performed with ardour or under the stress of passion. Again, subjective disposition is a deciding factor in the influence of any act to stimulate sexual motions. These three elements will practically decide the sinfulness of immodesty, namely, the quality of the act itself, the circumstances, the disposition of the agent.
When, therefore, divines put certain acts into the categories of grievous sins, they are speaking only of what normally happens, and they are taking general experience as their standard. When they say that certain immodest acts are grievous sins, they mean that these should normally be avoided under serious obligation.
Immodest Conversation
Immodest conversation or singing with the intention of exciting the hearers to lust is a grievous sin. If, however, the words used are merely suggestive or only slightly objectionable, or if, being obscene, they are spoken or sung jocosely, with no evil intention, the sin is venial. Coarse and detailed description of sexual matters might not greatly excite persons in middle age, but they would do so in the case of the young, and would then be a grave sin of scandal. Merely to overhear obscene conversation is a misfortune, but to listen to it so as to encourage it, or to take delight in it for the sake of the sensual pleasure that it excites, is a grievous sin. To listen from curiosity, as children do and are besmirched, or to laugh at obscene jokes from human respect, and even to add a word, is not per se a grievous sin.
The confessor will judge of the gravity of these sins of the tongue with the greatest difficulty. He should never ask penitents to repeat the objectionable words nor even to hint at them, and will check any attempt to do so. The obscenity and filth that are bandied about in shops and factories and wherever men and women congregate at work are most unbecoming to the sacred Tribunal. Such language is so common in most if not in all countries, that [227] it ceases to have much effect on the hearers. Nevertheless, the very young, going to work with the innocence of their childhood as yet unspoilt, are greatly shocked and distressed. The confessor will very wisely prepare them for these trials, by urging them to take no notice of the scandalous behaviour and conversation of others.
Dangerous Reading
The reading of a very obscene book without sufficient reason is usually a grievous sin. If the book must be read officially, or for the purpose of necessary refutation or necessary knowledge or for examination or style, always with permission, no sin is committed by the mere reading. If it is read in spite of the Church's prohibition, but is not likely to cause any sexual disturbance, nor causes any, the sin is one of disobedience, and is a grave one.
The reading of slightly objectionable books out of merely idle curiosity and without evil intention is a venial sin. This is the case with those novels which portray too passionate love. To read such books, not in themselves dangerous in a great degree, with an evil intention, is a grievous sin. In any case, much novel reading is dangerous for the young, as it fills their minds with thoughts on sex, and they fall victims to a not uncommon habit of thinking that sex is the only subject that matters, that sex pervades everything, and that it is the preoccupation of nearly half the race.
The greater the danger to the virtue of chastity the greater must be the justifying reason for reading what are called dangerous books.
Nude Objects and Nudism
